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case, it appears that, as in most other Kentucky cases, the Court, while
paying lip service to change: of conditions, applies the doctrine of
abandonment. In this case and the Goodwin case, supra, which are
apparently the only two Kentucky cases that have terminated the
restrictive covenants, 31 there was abandonment of the restrictive covenants by the owners inside the restricted property. In the Cochran,
Franklin, Mechling, Greer, and all other Kentucky cases where the
covenant was enforced there was a substantial change outside the
restricted property, while inside the restricted property there was a
minor change or no change at all. These cases tend to prove that the
Kentucky Court will enforce restrictive covenants even though a substantial amount of commerce has moved into the neighborhood, provided the restrictions in the subdivision have not been violated.
In conclusion, it appears that the Kentucky Court verbally recognizes the doctrine of change of conditions but in application it has
been made almost synonymous with abandonment. It is hoped that
in the future the Court will clearly distinguish between abandonment
and change of conditions in the neighborhood. And even though one
factor may be decisive in a particular case, it is urged that the Court
adequately consider all factors in determining whether there has been
such a change of conditions as to warrant a termination of the restrictive covenant.
G. Wayne Bridges
CREDITORS' RIGHTS-ENFORCING A JUDGMENT-WHEN IS
A LIEN CREATED ON PROPERTY OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR?
The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure provide that judgments
for the payment of money shall be enforced by writs of execution. 1
Kentucky Revised Statutes section 426.120 (1) (1953) provides: "An
execution against property shall bind the estate of the defendant only
from the time of its delivery to the proper officer to execute." In a
broad sense the purpose of this note is to explain the effect of this
statute on the judgment enforcement process in Kentucky. More
3' In Bagby v. Stewart's Ex'r., 265 SW 2d 75 (Ky. 1954), the grantor
restricted one lot, to residential purposes and the deeds to the remaining three lots
had no such restrictions. Later the grantor conveyed his own residence on part
of the remaining tract to a party to be used for commercial purposes. The Court
held that the grantor's right to enforce the covenant on the first lot was lost by
abandonment and waiver as well as by a change in the character of the neighborhood. The latter clause was merely thrown in by the Court and the case is
definitely one of abandonment or waiver of the restrictive covenant by the
grantor.

1 Rule 69.
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particularly an attempt is made to determine whether delivery of an
execution does in fact "bind" the estate of the defendant in the execution; "bind" in the sense that the plaintiff in the execution can satisfy
his judgment from the property of the defendant. There is no attempt
to outline all of the Kentucky cases on this subject. Such an effort
would be formidable as well as unprofitable. There is an attempt to discover the bases of past decisions in order to provide criteria for
predicting the outcome of future cases.
The term "bind" is the key word of section 426.120 (1). The word
is not a recent innovation in the Kentucky statutory scheme pertaining
to executions. The Kentucky General Assembly, apparently acting
under the belief that the laws of Virginia remained in force after separation from Virginia, did not treat the law relating to executions in
its entirety until 1796.2 In that year an act was passed to reduce into
one the several acts and parts of acts relating to executions. 3 The
word "bind" appears in that statute4 as it probably did in a similar
statute of Virginia.5 In fact the term appears in an early English
statute, which became a model for many of the states. 6 The term "lien"
is generally considered to be a fair interpretation of the word "bind"
and properly so.7 However, "lien" is by no means precise and requires
definition. 8 It will be used in this discussion to mean a right to have
property sold or applied in satisfaction of a debt.
Some mention should be made of the fact that recent cases involving an interpretation of section 426.120 (1) are relatively rare.
Prosperity, statutory provisions permitting garnishment and assignments for the benefit of creditors, and the popularity and ease of
obtaining discharges in bankruptcy may be reasons for the decline in
the number of cases involving executions. In addition, the statutory
language providing for the 'lien" of execution has remained unchanged
for many years. This has enabled the law to become settled, with a
resulting decrease in the number'of cases reaching the appellate level.
A plain meaning interpretation of section 426.120 (1) would indicate that a lien is created upon the property of the defendant in the
execution upon delivery of the writ of execution to the proper officer.
2 Kentucky became a State in 1792.
3 1 Stat. Law of Ky., Litt., c. 274, at 528 (1809).

Id. at 540.
5Id. at 538, at 534.
6Freeman, Executions 297 (1882).
7 1 Jones, Liens 3 n.2 (3d ed. 1914). The term lien is derived from French
Latin and means, inter alia, "to bind."
and ultimately
8
Without attempting to be exhaustive there are the following types of liens:
common law, statutory, equitable, and maritime. Each type possesses different
attributes.
4
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Unfortunately, one cannot stop with the statute. The law of the cases
has engrafted upon the statutes meaning various qualifications and
explanations applicable to different situations.
For the purposes of analysis the cases have been divided into three
major categories:
1. Cases involving the effect of acts relating to the debtor's property which do not constitute transfers for value;
2. Cases in which there has been an alienation of property by the
debtor for value;
3. Cases involving priority between creditors.
It will be noted that the first two categories involve some act in relation to the property by reason of which it is claimed that the delivery
of the execution is ineffectual, while the third category raises the
problem of priority between creditors. This classification is adopted
with two thoughts in mind. First, it is believed that whether a lien
is created upon compliance with the statute depends on the nature of
the transaction, which is said to prevent a lien from arising, and the
status of the parties litigating the issue. Second, it is hoped that this
classification will help provide an answer to the question of whether
the distinctions made in the cases are logical. Throughout the discussion it should be remembered that the principal problem under
consideration is whether delivery of the execution creates a lien on the
property of the defendant in the execution.
1. AcTs RELATnG TO TnE PROPERTY OF THE DEBTOR
NOT CoNsrrUTE TRANsFEas FOR VALuE.

WINcH Do

Three cases are used as examples to illustrate the principle underlying decisions within this category. In the first case an execution was
delivered to the sheriff with instructions to levy. The debtor committed an act of bankruptcy after delivery of the execution but prior to
levy. The involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed subsequent to
levy. A decree in bankruptcy relates back to the act of bankruptcy,
and the property of the bankrupt vests in the trustee as of the date the
act of bankruptcy occurred. In a contest between the execution
creditor and the trustee in bankruptcy the creditor prevailed. 9 The
effect of this decision was that the delivery of the execution to the
sheriff created a lien in favor of the creditor which was not lost by
reason of the act of bankruptcy occurring prior to levy.
In the second case a debtor occupied previously owned land subsequent to the delivery of an execution but prior to levy under the
9 Savage's Assignee v. Best, 44

U.S. 111 (3 How. 1845).
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execution. The debtor claimed this property as a homestead exempt
from execution up to one thousand dollars.10 If the creditor failed by
delivery of his execution to obtain a lien on the debtor's property the
claim of homestead should have upheld since the property would
have been exempt. However, the creditor prevailed because delivery
of the execution preceded occupancy of the land which meant in effect
11
that the lien was created at the time the execution was delivered.
One other case is illustrative of the principle inherent in this line
of cases. It has been held that an attachment placed in the hands of
the sheriff creates upon the property of the debtor a lien which is not
lost by reason of an assignment for the benefit of creditors made prior
to levy.' 2 Admittedly, an attachment was involved rather than an
execution, but an attachment and an execution have the same effect
in so far as a lien is concerned. 3
The thread of these cases is readily observable. They clearly illustrate that the delivery of an execution creates a lien on the property
of the debtor. But the important thing to observe is that none of the
acts subsequent to delivery of the writ of execution was a transfer for
value. No authority should be needed to assert that acquiring the
assets of a bankrupt by the trustee in bankruptcy; occupying land in
order to claim the homestead exemption; and an assignment for the
benefit of creditors are not transfers for the value. Inductively it may
be said that the lien created by delivery of an execution will not be
destroyed by a subsequent act in relation to the property that does not
constitute a transfer for value. Admittedly, this is a rather broad
generalization, but it is nevertheless believed to be accurate with only
one qualification which will be developed in the discussion of priority
between creditors.

2. TANsFERnS FOR VALUE BY THE DEBTOR.
The problem here is whether the delivery of an execution will
entitle the execution creditor or the purchaser at the execution sale to
prevail when a third party is claiming the debtor's property as a result
of a transfer for value. As a result of the passage of Kentucky Revised
Statutes sec. 882.450, the his pendens provision, a portion of the discussion that follows will be historical in so far as real property is concerned. Although academic in that sense, the reasoning and conclusions still apply to personal property in addition to providing a basis
lOKy. Rev. Stat. sec. 427.060 (1953). (Hereafter referred to as "KRS".)
Carter, Fisher & Co. v. Goodman, 74 Ky. 228 (11 Bush 1875).

11

12 Exchange Bank of Ky. v. Gillispie's Assignee, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1317, 43 SW

401 (1897).

13KRS see. 425.270 (1953); Brown's Adm'r. v. Gabhart, 232 Ky. 336, 23

SW 2d 551 (1930).
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for understanding the current law on real property as affected by the
execution process.
Two early cases provide a good starting point for a discussion of
the problem. In the case of Million v. Riley' 4 an executory contract
for the sale of land had been entered into by the debtor who was
the vendor. Subsequently an execution was placed in the hands of
an authorized officer. The sale under the contract was completed
prior to the levy under the execution. In an action of ejectment it
was held that the purchaser at the execution sale, although he had
knowledge of the sale under the terms of the contract, should prevail
as against the debtor's vendee. The court reasoned that the purchaser
at the execution sale was entitled to prevail since his deed related
back to the date of the lien which was created when the execution
was delivered. 15 The court refused to consider the equities of the
parties since the action was at law.
In the case of Chinn v. Butt[s] an executory contract for the sale
of the debtor's land was also in existence prior to the delivery of the
execution. 16 The purchaser at the execution sale had knowledge of
this agreement. The only factual difference was that the purchaser
under the executory agreement did not obtain a deed nor pay the
purchase price until after the levy of the execution, although still prior
to the execution sale. In contrast to the Million case this action was in
equity and the court held that the purchaser under the executory agreement was entitled to prevail although he had been the unsuccessful
party in an action of ejectment.
It should be emphasized that these cases consider the question of
whether the purchaser at the execution sale, who may be the creditor
or a third party, can prevail as a result of the execution against the
holder of a prior equity. These cases illustrate two important principles. First, under the decision in the Million case it must be recognized that a lien was created, at law, on the property of the defendant
from the time the execution was delivered. This must be the holding
of the court since failure to recognize the creation of a lien upon
delivery of the execution or earlier would have resulted in a judgment
for the purchaser under the executory contract since he completed his
purchase prior to levy or sale under the execution. The other principle
is demonstrated by the decision in Chinn v. Butt[s]. This case makes
14 3i Ky:*859 (1 Dana 1883).
15
principle that a conveyance made pursuant to a levy and sale relates

back to the commencement of the lien so as to overreach an intermediate conveyance was not idle chatter in so far as the Kentucky court is concerned. For
another expression of the same thought, see Addison v. Crow, 85 Ky. 271, 274
(5 Dana 1887).
16 88 Ky. 547 (3 Dana 1885).
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it clear that notice of a prior equity prevents the purchaser at an
execution sale from defeating the holder of that equity. This was true
even though he obtained the prior legal title by relation back to the
date when the execution was delivered.
The rule that knowledge of a prior equity will prevent the purchaser at the execution sale from prevailing in a contest with the
holder of that equity has become well established. 17 On the other
hand, the purchaser at the execution sale will be successful if he purchased without notice of a prior equity.'" The ratio decidendi seems
simple. The purchaser at the execution sale must satisfy the requirements of a bona fide purchaser in order to be successful against the
holder of the prior equity. It is necessary for him to acquire legal
title for value without notice of the prior equity. 19 Does a lien arise
upon delivery of the execution where the question arises between the
holder of a prior equity and the execution purchaser? A lien is created
only in the sense that the title of the purchaser at the execution sale
relates back to the delivery of the execution. This means simply that
if he meets the other requirements of a bona fide purchaser his legal
title would have seniority to any gained after delivery of the execution.
There was a significant change in the law with respect to real
property in 1896. A statute now provides that an execution does not
affect the rights of a subsequent purchaser of real estate except from
the time a memorandum is ified containing certain information about
the execution and the parties to it. 2 0

Under the provisions of this

statute, if the creditor has failed to file the required memorandum, the
debtor's vendee, if without knowledge of the execution, cannot be
deprived of his purchase. 21 The importance of this provision lies in
the fact that the date of filing of the memorandum becomes the date
to which reference is made for the legal title of the purchaser at the
execution sale. By the same token a creditor seeking to set aside a sale
by his debtor could not claim a legal charge on the debtor's estate
except from the time the memorandum was filed. No cases have been
found which say that once the memorandum is filed the legal title of
17 Campbell v. Mos[elby, 16 Ky. 358 (Litt. 1821); Morton v. Robards, 34 Ky.
258 (4 Dana 1836).
18 Halley v. Oldham, 44 Ky. 233 (5 B. Mon. 1844).
19 Ordinarily legal title must be acquired before one can obtain the status of
a bona fide purchaser. However, it has been held that when the purchaser at the
execution sale has paid the purchase price in money or executed a bond for the
purchase price which has the force of judgment, notice of a prior equity subsequent to sale, although prior to delivery of the deed will not prevent him from
becoming a bona fide purchaser. Halley v. Oldham, supra, note 18.
20 KRS see. 382.450 (1953).
21 Low v. Skaggs, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1292, 105 SW 439 (1907); Roark v. Bank
of Fountain Run, 184 Ky. 109, 211 SW 561 (1919).
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the purchaser at the execution sale would relate back to the date of
delivery of the execution so as to overreach a conveyance made subsequent to delivery but prior to filing. When does the lien arise? It
can only be concluded that it does not arise until the required memorandum is filed. Once the memorandum is filed it is a lien in the
limited sense that the legal title of the purchaser will relate back to
the date of filing.
It has been argued that a distinction should be made between real
and personal property for purposes of determining whether a lien
has been created. 22 Kentucky Revised Statutes section 426.120 (1)
provides that the binding effect of the delivery of an execution applies
to the "estate" of the debtor. This language does not indicate any
distinction between real and personal property. It is true that the lis
pendens statute does not apply to personal property. However, eliminating transactions involving this statute, this discussion has been
premised on the idea that where a lien has been created on real property it would also be created on personal property. There seems to be
no authority in the cases for making a distinction except when the lis
23
pendens provision is applicable.

3. PwoRm y BETWEEN GREDrrons.

The question often arises between creditors as to which one shall
have priority in obtaining satisfaction of his judgment. Which of two
creditors shall have priority when executions are delivered to the same
officer but the junior execution is the first to be levied? What is the
result where one execution is delivered to one officer and another
creditor delivers an execution to a second officer and again the junior
execution is the first to be levied? These are the questions of concern
within this classification.
There is one important preliminary matter. It has apparently never
been judicially decided in Kentucky whether Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 382.450 (1958), the lis pendens provision, is applicable
to a judgment creditor. In other words, is one judgment creditor pro22
23

See Note, 41 Ky. L. J. 464 (1953).
One writer has taken the position that a levy is necessary to create a lien

on personal property. Note, supra note 22 at 467. The case of C. T. C. Invest-

ment Co. v. Daniel Boone Coal Corp., 58 F 2d 305 (ED Ky. 1931) is relied on
to support this position. Apparently reliance is laced in part on the following at

314: The lien of the execution, however, can be enforced in but one way, and
that is by levy and sale. This being so, if the execution is returned, or its return
day expired without a levy, the lien is released." This is all very true but it applies to any execution lien whether it be on personalty or realty. A levy is a necessary element of the execution process and must be accomplished before the return
day of the execution in order to preserve the lien created by delivery. See Daniel
v. Coehrans Admr., 7 Ky. 532 (4 Bibb 1817).
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tected by a failure on the part of the other judgment creditor to file the
required memorandum? The statute includes within those protected
by a failure to fie notice a ". . . subsequent purchaser, lessee, or encumbrancer." The class of persons within the protection of this statute
appears to be transferees for value. Execution creditors are not transferees for value.2 4 Although a judgiment creditor who delivers an
execution to an authorized officer might be thought of as an encumbrancer, the more reasonable position would seem to be that he is not
within the protection of the statute.
At common law an officer was under a duty to levy executions in
the order in which they were received. 25 There is a statutory basis for
this duty in Kentucky. One statute provides that "Executions... shall
be levied and satisfied by the constable according to the priority of
time in which they are placed in his hands."26 Another statute contains
a provision applicable to all officers having a duty to levy executions.
"If two or more executions are delivered to the officer on the same day
against the same person, he shall satisfy that one first which first comes
into his hands."27 At common law the reason for such rules was not
the thought that a lien arose when an execution was delivered. The
purpose was rather to encourage impartiality on the part of the officer.
It cannot be said, therefore, merely because an officer is under a duty
to levy executions in the order in which they are received and is liable
for a breach of such a duty,2s that delivery of an execution operates
to create a lien in favor of the senior execution creditor. There is, however, authority for such a position from another source.
It is frequently said that as between execution creditors the first
levy gives priority.29 This statement is not fully supported by authority.
As between executions in the hands of different officers the first levy
does give priority.30 However, where attachments were delivered to
the same officer but to different deputies, it has been held that the
creditor who was the first to deliver his attachment was entitled to
priority as against a junior attachment which was levied first. 31 Ad1 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences 37 (rev. ed. 1940).
5 Tabb v. Harris, 7 Ky. 29, 30 (4 Bibb 1814).
263IRS sec. 70.370 (1953).
2
7KRS see. 426.120 (2) (1953).
28
Million v. Commonwealth, 40 Ky. 310 (1 B. Mon. 1841). There is the
additional factor in this case of notice on the part of the deputy holding the
junior2 execution that the senior execution was in the hands of another deputy.
9 Arberry v. Noland, 25 Ky. 421, 422 (2 J. J.Marsh. 1829); Kilby v. Haggin,
26 Ky.
3 0 208, 212 (3 J. J.Marsh. 1830).
Bourne v. Hocker, 50 Ky. 23 (11 B. Mon. 1850). An attachment and an
execution were involved in this case. See supra note 13 for authority that both
are treated
the same for lien purposes.
31
Kennon v. Ficklin, 45 Ky. 414 (6 B. Mon. 1846).
24
2
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mittedly, the attachments were in the hands of two different deputies,
but they must both be considered to be agents of the officer.
Are these decisions consistent with the analysis up to this point?
There is only partial consistency. Litigation between competing
creditors is closely analogous to the cases discussed under the first
category. The analogy exists due to the fact that the execution
creditor is not a purchaser for value. Since it was concluded that the
delivery of an execution would result in a lien in cases where there was
no transfer for value, the cases holding that the first levy determines
priority between competing creditors when the executions are in the
hands of different officers are inconsistent. However there is a good
reason for the seemingly inconsistent results. The existing rule where
executions are in the hands of different officers can probably be justified on the ground that it will prevent friction on the part of the competing officers. One officer having taken possession of property would
perhaps be unwilling to yield possession to another officer because
the other was the first to receive an execution. Partial consistency with
the previous analysis is maintained by the decision giving priority to
the creditor who had seniority in relation to delivery, when the same
officer receives both writs, although the competing creditor was the
first to obtain a levy.
CONCLUSION

In answering the question of whether a lien has been created it is
necessary to examine the transaction which is alleged to have avoided
the lien and the status of the parties. Whether a lien has been
created by delivery or some other act depends on the circumstances of
each case. Was there a transfer of the debtor's property? If so was it
a transfer for value? Can the transferee claim the protection of a bona
fide purchaser? Are competing creditors involved? Having asked
these questions the following principles may be applied to decide
whether a lien has been created for the particular case.
1. If there has been some act in relation to the property, such as a
transfer or claim of homestead, after delivery of the execution,
but it does not constitute a transfer for value, the delivery of
the execution creates a lien on the property of the debtor provided the parties are not competing creditors;
2. If the debtor's property has been transferred for value after
delivery of the execution a lien is created only in the sense that
legal title will relate back to delivery of the execution, except
where real property is involved and then the relation back will
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be only to the date of compliance with Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 882.450 (1953). In order to defeat a prior
equity the purchaser at the execution sale must be a bona fide
purchaser.
3. If competing creditors have delivered executions to different
officers, the first levy prevails, but if to the same officer, the first
delivery creates a lien on the debtor's property.
Carl W. Turner

EVIDENCE-THE VANISHING PRESUMPTION
Jane's husband has been absent and unheard of for seven years.
Jane, as beneficiary of a life insurance policy on his life, seeks to obtain
its proceeds by suing the reluctant insurance company. At the trial,
upon proof of the basic facts of absence for seven years without cause
or suspicious circumstances, there arises a universally recognized
presumption that the husband is dead. The insurance company introduces evidence from the lips of a witness, who says he saw the husband
last year in Timbuktu. At this point we have a presumption which has
been challenged by contradictory evidence. What happens to this rebuttal presumption is the topic of this paper. According to one writer,
there are three answers expressed by the courts in answer to the above
question: (1) The Thayer-Wigmore theory, to the effect that the
presumption vanishes upon the introduction of evidence to the contrary and unless the party relying on the presumption then goes forward with evidence to support the fact presumed, a verdict will be
directed in favor of the opposing party.1 The sole effect of the presumption, under this view, is to place on the other party the duty of
going forward with the evidence. (2) The Presumption-as-Evidence
theory, that the evidence supporting the presumption, the presumption
itself, and contrary evidence, if any, are submitted to the jury. Under
this view the presumption is weighed as evidence in deciding the fact
in issue.2 (8) The Conditional Submission to the Jury theory, that it is
for the jury to determine the truth and veracity of the evidence contradicting the presumption. Under this view if the jury believes the
contrary evidence then it must find for the party against whom the
presumption would have operated. But if the jury disbelieves the
contrary evidence, then the presumption is controlling and the jury
must find accordingly. Under this view the presumption does not
I McBaine, Presumptions; Are They Evidence?, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 519, at 532

(1938).

2 d. at 532-533.

